Reverse mortgages allow elderly homeowners to tap into their housing wealth without having to sell or move out of their homes. However, very few eligible homeowners have used reverse mortgages to achieve consumption smoothing until recently when the reverse mortgage market in the United States witnessed substantial growth. This paper examines 1989-2007 loan-level reverse mortgage data and presents a number of findings. First, I show that recent reverse mortgage borrowers are significantly different from earlier borrowers in many respects. Second, I find that borrowers who take the line-of-credit payment plan, single male borrowers, and borrowers with higher house values exit their homes sooner than other reverse mortgage borrowers. Third, I combine the reverse mortgage data with county-level house price data to show that elderly homeowners are more likely to purchase reverse mortgages when the local housing market is at its peak. This finding suggests that the 2000-05 housing market boom may be partially responsible for the rapid growth of reverse mortgage markets. Lastly, I show that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage limits, which cap the amount of housing wealth that an eligible homeowner can borrow against, have no effect on the demand for reverse mortgages. The findings have important implications to both policy-making and the economics of housing and aging.
Introduction
Housing wealth is often the largest non-pension wealth component for many elderly homeowners. For example, the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data suggest that for 6.5 million homeowners aged 62 or above, housing wealth represents at least 80% of their total wealth. To determine whether Americans are saving enough for retirement, it is crucial to decide how housing wealth should be treated: Are elderly homeowners willing and able to use their housing equity to finance spending in retirement? According to the 2007 SCF, 4.2 million homeowners aged 62 or above had a house-value-to-income ratio of at least 10. For these house-rich elderly homeowners, reverse mortgages would seem to carry the potential to increase their consumption while allowing them to continue living in their homes.
The most common type of reverse mortgage is the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM), insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and constituting over 90% of the U.S. reverse mortgage market.
1 Despite its potential economic appeal, using reverse mortgages to finance consumption after retirement has been the exception rather than the rule among elderly homeowners. From its inception in 1989 to the end of 2007, out of tens of millions of eligible homeowners, less than 400,000 loans were originated through the HECM program.
Although usage remains relatively low, reverse mortgage markets have grown substantially in recent years. For example, in the early 1990s, only a few hundred HECM loans were originated each year. In contrast, in 2007, over 100,000 reverse mortgage loans were originated through the HECM program. Plausible explanations include rising house values, lower interest rates, and increasing awareness of the product. Also, whether the expansion is transitory or permanent remains unclear. Addressing these questions is not only essential to understanding elderly homeowners' desire to consume housing wealth, but it also provides evidence for policymakers to conduct the cost-benefit analysis and to design more efficient policies in facilitating the conversion of home equity into liquid assets.
In this paper, I examine all HECM loans that were originated from 1989 through 2007. I first present descriptive evidence on the characteristics of HECM borrowers and HECM loans with an emphasis on how these characteristics have changed over time. I then study the loan termination and assignment outcomes using probit and proportional hazard models. A HECM loan is terminated when the borrower dies or permanently moves out of the house. The estimates suggest that borrowers who choose the line-of-credit payment plan, single male borrowers, and borrowers with more expensive homes terminate their HECM loans sooner than other reverse mortgage borrowers. In addition, I investigate the link between house price appreciation and the growth of reverse mortgage markets. I show evidence suggesting that areas at the peak of the housing market tend to experience more increases in HECM loan origination. Lastly, I examine the role of FHA mortgage limits in the reverse mortgage market. The county-specific FHA mortgage limits effectively cap the amount of housing equity a borrower can convert into liquid assets. I find no evidence to support the claim that FHA mortgage limits have prevented reverse mortgages from becoming more popular.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper using 18 years of HECM loan-level data to systematically study the reverse mortgage market. I take the first step to address
questions such as what factors have contributed to the rapid growth of reverse mortgage markets in recent years. According to the Census Bureau, the number of persons above age 65 will increase to 40 million in 2010 and increase further to 81 million in 2040. The questions addressed in this paper will become increasingly important with the population aging and the baby-boomers' entering retirement age.
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews the existing literature on reverse mortgages and introduces the HECM program in detail. In section 3, I describe the data used in this paper. I then show the characteristics of HECM loans and HECM borrowers in section 4. Sections 5, 6, and 7 discuss the empirical evidence on loan termination and assignment outcomes, house price appreciation, and FHA mortgage limits, respectively.
The last section concludes and clarifies common misconceptions about the reverse mortgage market.
Background 2.1 Overview of Existing Studies
The question of whether Americans are financially prepared for retirement has inspired heated debates in the literature.
2 When evaluating retirement saving adequacy, economists and financial planners have to decide whether housing equity should be included as consumable wealth. Because housing is both a consumption good and an investment good, the correct treatment of housing equity may not be obvious in the retirement saving context.
For example, while Mitchell and Moore (1998) add housing equity to household net worth, Bernheim et al. (2000) exclude it in their calculation. More recently, Sinai and Souleles (2008) suggest that the fraction of "consumable housing equity" ranges from 60% to 99% Venti and Wise (e.g., 1989 , 1990 show that elderly homeowners do not reduce their housing wealth in the absence of precipitating events such as the death of a spouse or a move to a nursing home. If elderly homeowners have strong psychological attachments to their homes, then reverse mortgages, which generate additional income and liquid assets for elderly homeowners while allowing them to continue living in their homes, may be welfare-improving for many households.
A number of studies have estimated the potential size of the reverse mortgage market. Venti and Wise (1991) analyze the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data and find that a reverse mortgage in the form of annuity payments would substantially affect the income of the single elderly who are very old. Merrill et al. (1994) use the 1989 American Housing Survey (AHS) data to show that out of the 12 million elderly homeowners who own their homes free and clear, 800,000 could benefit substantially from reverse mortgages. Mayer and Simons (1994) consider both income increases and debt reductions as benefits of reverse mortgages and find a much larger potential market for reverse mortgages than previous studies: Over 6 million homeowners in the U.S. could see their effective monthly income being raised at least 20% by reverse mortgages.
In practice, the reverse mortgage market is much smaller than expected. On the demand side, a number of factors may have prevented the reverse mortgage market from growing bigger. First, elderly homeowners with strong bequest motives may not find reverse mortgages attractive because reverse mortgages reduce the amount of wealth they can leave to their estates. Second, the probability of shouldering large medical expenses increases over 3 See Bayer and Harper (2000) .
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time for the elderly. In the absence of other forms of protections such as Long-Term Care
Insurance, many elderly homeowners use their housing equity to self-insure. Using a survey conducted on 2,673 homeowners aged 50 to 65, Munnell et al. (2007) Besides the factors discussed above, economists have also recognized that reverse mortgage markets may suffer from adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Because reverse mortgage loans are not due until the borrower dies or permanently moves out, people who know they are likely to stay in their homes for a long time will find reverse mortgages more attractive than others. However, Davidoff and Welke (2007) find advantageous selection in the HECM program. In other words, HECM borrowers appear to exit their homes at a faster pace than the general population. The authors suggest that higher discount rate among the borrowers combined with house price appreciation may explain observed advantageous selection. Furthermore, economists are concerned that the moral hazard problem of home maintenance would make lenders think twice before entering the reverse mortgage market. Davidoff (2006) uses AHS data to show that homeowners over 75 years of age spend less on routine maintenance than younger owners of similar homes.
Overall, most of the studies on reverse mortgages do not have loan-level data and, therefore, have to rely on hypothetical borrowers. Among the few studies that do look at loan-level data, Davidoff (2006) and Szymanoski et al. (2007) focus only on termination rates of HECM loans, and Case and Schnare (1994) and Rodda et al. (2000) analyze only the data from earlier years of the HECM program. Given that 88% of all HECM loans originated from 1989 through 2007 were taken out after 2000, the field calls for research using more recent data. This paper aims to fill the gap. The second step is to determine the Initial Principal Limit (IPL) by multiplying the MCA by a factor between zero and one. The magnitude of the factor depends on the age of the borrower and the "expected interest rate" at the time of loan closing. 6 The expected interest rate, a proxy for future interest rate, equals the sum of the ten-year Treasury rate and the lender's margin. The lender's margin is typically between 100 and 200 basis points.
These principal limit factors are designed such that, under certain assumptions, the loan balance reaches the MCA at the time when the loan becomes due in expectation.
7 As a result, the factor increases with the borrower's age and decreases with the expected interest rate. For example, the factor equals 0.281 for a 65-year-old at a 10 percent expected rate, and it equals 0.819 for an 85-year-old at a 5 percent expected rate.
The third step is to calculate the Net Principal Limit (NPL), which is the amount the borrower can take as a lump sum in cash at closing, by subtracting from the initial principal limit the upfront costs associated with HECM loans and a set-aside for a monthly servicing fee. The upfront costs include the initial Mortgage Insurance Premium (MIP), origination fee, and closing costs. The initial MIP is set at 2% of the MCA. The origination fee is set at $2,000 or 2% of the MCA, whichever is greater. 8 Closing costs include origination fees and other third-party fees such as appraisal fees, credit report fees, and title insurance fees. Overall, the upfront costs on a HECM loan range between $7,000 and $20,000. A servicing fee set-aside is the present value of the monthly servicing fee charged by the lender.
6 For married couples, only the age of the younger borrower is taken into consideration. 7 See Szymanoski (1994) for detailed discussions on the assumptions that HUD makes to calculate the principal limit factors.
8 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 established new limits on the loan origination fee for HECM loans. The limit is the greater of $2,500 or 2 percent of the first $200,000 of the MCA, plus 1 percent of the portion of the MCA that is greater than $200,000. The total amount of loan origination fee may not exceed $6,000.
The typical monthly servicing fee is $30 or $35. Both the upfront costs and servicing fees are financed rather than paid by the borrower out of pocket. Figure 1 summarizes the steps described above in calculating the net principal limit.
Given the amount of net principal limit, HECM borrowers can choose from five payment plans to receive the mortgage proceeds. Under the Tenure plan, the borrower will receive equal monthly payments from the lender for as long as the borrower lives and continues to occupy the property as her principal residence. This payment plan is also called a "reverse annuity mortgage" in the literature due to its resemblance to an annuity product.
Under the Term plan, the borrower will receive equal monthly payments from the lender for a fixed period of months selected by the borrower. Note that even though payments stop at the end of the selected term, the loan is not due until the borrower dies or moves out of his or her home. Under the Line of Credit plan, the borrower will receive the mortgage proceeds in unscheduled payments or in installments, at times and in amounts of the borrower's choosing, until the line of credit is exhausted. This payment plan is the most popular among HECM borrowers. In addition, the Modified Tenure plan allows the borrower to combine a line of credit with a tenure plan. The Modified Term plan allows the borrower to combine a line of credit with a term plan.
9 Table 1 shows the principal limit factor, net principal limit, the monthly payment under a tenure plan, and monthly payment under a 10-year term plan for a hypothetical borrower, assuming a MCA of $200,000, an initial MIP of $4,000, an origination fee of $4,000, closing costs of $2,000, and a monthly servicing fee of $30.
One key feature of HECM loans is the FHA insurance program. Under this program, HUD insures the borrower against the risk that the lender can no longer make the contracted payments. It also insures the lender against the risk that the loan balance exceeds the property value. For example, lenders can assign loans to HUD when the loan balance reaches 9 Borrowers may change their payment plan throughout the life of the loan at a small cost.
98% of the MCA. In the event that the proceeds from the sale of the property are not sufficient to pay the outstanding loan balance, lenders who have not assigned the mortgage to HUD can submit a claim for insurance benefits up to the MCA. To pay for this insurance program, HUD charges a Mortgage Insurance Premium (MIP). The initial MIP, as mentioned before, is set at 2% of the MCA. The monthly MIP is set at an annual rate of 0.5% and is charged on the outstanding balance of a HECM loan.
Data Description
The data I analyze in this paper are the loan-level HECM data provided by HUD. county-level FHA mortgage limit data to examine the effect of these limits on the demand for reverse mortgages. Lastly, I used a data set purchased from the United States Postal
Service to match ZIP codes with counties for each HECM loan in my sample.
The administrative data analyzed in this paper are essential for studying the reverse mortgage market, because reverse mortgage borrowers are a tiny fraction of the general population and they are unlikely to be captured by public surveys. In addition, administrative data tend to be more accurate than self-reported data in most public surveys. Nevertheless, there are a couple of caveats associated with the data. First, similar to many administrative data sets, we do not know very much about these borrowers beyond their characteristics that are used in the HECM pricing model. For example, we do not know the income and financial wealth of these borrowers, nor do we know their demographic characteristics such as race, eduction, and number of children. Second, according to the staff member at HUD who shared the data with us, our data come from a snapshot at the end of 2007. Because borrowers are allowed to change their payment plans at a small cost, it is possible that the payment plan we observe is not the original payment plan chosen by the borrower. Such a spike suggests that homeowners younger than age 62 may want to purchase reverse mortgages if allowed. These two features imply that the demand for reverse mortgages has been growing most rapidly among younger elderly homeowners.
Besides age, Panel A of Table 2 An elderly homeowner who wants to tap into her housing wealth generally has two options: selling the house or taking out a HECM loan, both of which involves considerable transaction costs. While selling the house would allow the elderly homeowner to access all of her housing equity, the FHA mortgage limits may limit the fraction of housing equity she wants to tap into. It has been argued in the literature that reverse mortgages may not be attractive to potential borrowers because of such limitations on the fraction of housing equity against which one can borrow. In Figure 5 , I plotted the distribution of the ratio of Initial Principal Limit (IPL) to house value for early borrowers and recent borrowers respectively.
Recall that the IPL represents the present value of all payments that may be received by the borrower plus the upfront costs. The higher the IPL-to-house-value ratio is, the larger the fraction of the illiquid housing equity the borrower can access at the time of origination.
The IPL is the product of MCA and a factor that increases with age and decreases with expected interest rates. For early borrowers, the average IPL is 54.9% of the house value.
For recent borrowers, the average IPL-to-house-value ratio is 65.9%. The increase in the IPL-to-house-value ratio is presumably driven by lower interest rates in recent years.
The HECM data used in this paper have information on state and ZIP code of the property for each loan. In summary, the above analyses indicate that reverse mortgage borrowers are not representative of elderly homeowners in the general population. The characteristics of reverse mortgage borrowers and loans changed notably from the early years of the HECM program to now. Thus, conclusions drawn by studies using early HECM loan data may no longer apply to recent borrowers. Moreover, there appears to be significant heterogeneity in the distribution of reverse mortgages across geographic areas.
Termination and Assignment Outcomes
A HECM loan is terminated when the borrower dies or permanently moves out the house.
A HECM loan is assigned by the lender to HUD when the loan balance reaches 98% of the MCA. In this section, I examine whether various borrower and loan characteristics are correlated with the termination and assignment outcomes of HECM loans. Figure 7 compares the termination rates of HECM borrowers with the mortality rates observed in the general population for males and females respectively. Throughout the age distribution, termination rates of HECM borrowers are consistently higher than mortality rates of the general population. For example, the termination rate of a single female HECM borrower at age 75 is 0.093, whereas the female mortality rate at age 75 is only 0.028. Presumably, this difference reflects the residential mobility rate among reverse mortgage borrowers because HECM loans are terminated when borrowers move out of their homes permanently. Potential differences in mortality rates between HECM borrowers and the general population may also contribute to the observed pattern. For example, if elderly homeowners who experienced negative health shocks purchase reverse mortgages to cover medical expenses, then reverse mortgage borrowers are also likely to have a higher mortality rate than non-borrowers. The HECM program assumes that termination rates among borrowers are 1.3 times the age-specific female mortality rate. As shown in Figure 7 , this assumption is overly conservative, and HECM borrowers exit homes as a much faster pace.
To understand how loans of different characteristics terminate differently, I first estimated a probit model of the 5-year loan termination outcome.
T erminate iat equals one if loan i terminates within 5 years of origination. HV iat is the real house value at the time of loan origination. η a is a full set of age fixed effects, and θ t is a full set of origination year fixed effects.
Column (1) of Table 4 displays the estimation results. Compared to borrowers who choose the line-of-credit payment plan, borrowers who choose the tenure payment plan are, on average, 13.6% less likely to exit homes permanently within five years of loan origination.
Because the line-of-credit option allows borrowers to withdraw home equity more quickly than the tenure option, this finding is consistent with the conjecture that borrowers who believe that they will stay in their homes for a long time tend to choose the more back-loaded payment plan -the tenure option. Compared to the probit model, a hazard model takes into account censoring and time-varying explanatory variables. I estimated a Cox proportional hazard model
where λ iat,s is the termination hazard rate s periods after loan origination for borrower i of age a who originated the loan at time t. λ 0 s is the non-parametric baseline hazard rate. HV iat,s refers to the real house value s periods after loan origination. It is calculated using the real house value at origination and the county-level house price indexes. h iat,s is the real house price appreciation rate s periods after loan origination in the county where borrower i lives.
Column (1) of Table 5 
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Similar to studying the termination outcome before, I examined the assignment outcome using both a probit model and a Cox proportional hazard model. The estimation results are shown in column (3) and (4) of Table 4 and Table 5 . Both models suggest that loans with term or tenure payment plans are much less likely to be assigned from lenders to HUD than loans with the line-of-credit payment plan. For example, the hazard model estimates indicate that term loans are 20% less likely to be assigned than line-of-credit loans, and tenure loans are 80% less likely to be assigned than line-of-credit loans. Given that tenure plan monthly payments are calculated assuming the borrower keeps receiving money until her 100th birthday, it is not surprising that tenure loans have such a low assignment
hazard. The probit model shows that loans made to single female and married couples tend to be assigned more often than loans made to single males. However, these estimates are no longer statistically significant in the hazard model. In addition, house values and house price appreciation rates appear to have little effect on loan assignment outcomes. The amount of loan that a reverse mortgage borrower can access is an increasing function of the appraised house value. When house prices go up, elderly homeowners can borrow more against their homes. For example, Table 1 shows that a homeowner who is 21 75 years of age with a $200,000 home can pocket $107,715 at the time of loan origination, assuming an expected interest rate of 7 percent. Suppose housing prices in the area rises by 25% and the homeowner's home is now appraised at $250,000. Under the same assumptions about interest rate and upfront transaction costs, he or she can now take home $137,165. The additional $30,000 makes reverse mortgages more attractive. Therefore, all else equal, house price appreciation rates should have a positive effect on the demand for reverse mortgages.
To estimate this effect, I collapsed the loan-level data into county-year level data. I then regressed the percentage change in the number of reverse mortgage loans between time t and t + 1 in each county on the real house price appreciation rate between time t − 1 and time t.
Orig c,t − Orig c,t−1 Orig c,t−1 = α + βh c,t−1 + η c + θ t + c,t
I controlled for county fixed effects η c and year fixed effects θ t . To make sure that the dependent variable is measured meaningfully, I limited the sample to counties that have at least 50 reverse mortgages at time t − 1.
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Column (1) of Table 6 displays the estimation results. The estimated coefficient on the real house price appreciation rate is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that places with rising house values tend to have more reverse mortgages originated in the following period. The sample average of the dependent variable is 38.6, meaning that on average the number of reverse mortgages within a county increased by 38.6% per year in the analysis sample. The sample average of h c,t−1 equals 4.0, meaning that, on average, the county-level real house price appreciation rate is 4.0 percent per year. The magnitude of the estimate suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the annual real house price appreciation rate within the county induces the number of reverse mortgages to grow by 2.5 percentage points. In column (2) and (3), I added lags of the real house price appreciation rate. It appears that the growth rate in reverse mortgages responds most significantly to last year's house price appreciation rate. The housing market movement from three years ago no longer has a noticeable effect on the demand for reverse mortgages.
From 2001 to 2006, median house values in the United States increased by approximately 10% a year in real terms. During the same period of time, the number of reverse mortgages grew by almost 9 times, or 50% a year. The estimates shown in Table 6 imply that a house price appreciation rate of 10% raises the reverse mortgage growth rate by 25%. Therefore, the model estimated above suggests that house price appreciation accounts for about one-half of the overall growth in the reverse mortgage market between 2001 and 2006.
Because a higher house value means that more liquid assets can be extracted from the same physical house through the HECM program, elderly homeowners should find reverse mortgages most desirable when the local housing market is at its peak. To a certain extent, the FHA insurance program insures against the risk of significant house price drops after a HECM loan is originated. If local residents have private information on the future house price movement in the area, they may take advantage of the FHA insurance program and borrow reverse mortgage loans when they expect their house price to decline. To test this hypothesis, I add the house price appreciation rate from time t to t + 1 to the regression model.
Column (4) of Table 6 displays the estimation results. The estimated coefficient on next year's house price appreciation rate is negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of the estimate suggests that a 10% increase in next year's house prices is cor-related with a drop of 7.4 percentage points in reverse mortgage originations. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that reverse mortgages are most desirable when the local housing market reaches its peak.
In summary, evidence shown in this section suggests that elderly homeowners in areas where the housing market is at its peak are more likely to borrow reverse mortgages.
A run-up in previous house prices leads to increases in reverse mortgage originations, which in turn are correlated with declines in house price appreciation rates. A large literature has pointed out that many older households in the United States lack basic financial knowledge and make mistakes in saving and planning for retirement. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2005) find that financial illiteracy is widespread among older Americans. The evidence shown in this section seems to suggest that the opposite is true in the reverse mortgage market.
FHA Mortgage Limits
As mentioned before, the amount of housing wealth an elderly homeowner can borrow against his or her home is the Maximum Claim Amount (MCA). MCA equals the appraised house value or the county-specific FHA mortgage limit on HECM loans, whichever is smaller. The where 1(AboveCeiling) c,t−1 indicates whether the median house value in county c at time t − 1 is above the national ceiling for HECM loans at that time. It is a measure of whether the national ceiling is binding in that county. If FHA limits reduce the demand for reverse mortgages in high house value areas, then β would be negative.
Column (1) of Table 7 shows the estimation results. Consistent with the findings in the previous section, real house price appreciation rates in the last period have a large and positive effect on reverse mortgage originations. Counties where the national ceiling is binding have fewer reverse mortgage originations on average, although the effect is not statistically significant. The coefficient of interest, β, is estimated to be negative but very small and statistically insignificant, which suggests that FHA mortgage limits on HECM loans have little effect on reverse mortgage origination. In columns (2) and (3) Hence, the borrower remains the residual claimant on the value of the property, and the moral hazard problem of home maintenance may not be as severe as many people believe.
Another common misconception about the HECM program is that the tenure payment plan, which gives borrowers equal monthly payments for as long as they are alive and continue living in their homes, is equivalent to an annuity. For immediate life annuities, insurance against outliving one's assets is provided by pooling mortality risks across a group of people. However, the tenure plan of HECM loans involves little risk-pooling: If a borrower dies shortly after his or her HECM loan is originated, the borrower pays back only the loan balance, which presumably is small. HUD does not inherit this borrower's entire housing equity to pay another borrower who lives to be over 100 years old. Thus, the 27 longevity insurance aspect of a tenure HECM loan is very limited. In addition, only 10%
of HECM borrowers choose the tenure payment plan or the modified tenure payment plan, which suggests that the annuity aspect of reverse mortgages is irrelevant to most borrowers.
Furthermore, many people believe that the high costs associated with HECM loans indicate that these loans are a bad deal for elderly homeowners. One reason that a reverse mortgage costs more than a regular forward mortgage is that HUD charges an MIP to insure both the lender and the borrower. Precisely because there is little risk-pooling in the HECM program, insurance premiums have to be high for HUD to break even. As a result, one may have to change the fundamental structure of the HECM program to cut the costs significantly. It is hoped that the descriptions and analyses presented in this paper will help correct these misconceptions. Note: Data are from 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances. (1) and (2) is whether the loan terminates within five years of origination. The dependent variable in column (3) and (4) is whether the loan is assigned by the lender to HUD within five years of origination. The numbers shown are the marginal effects on termination and assignment probabilities. * significant at 0.05 level. ** significant at 0.01 level. Note: A county must have at least 50 reverse mortgage loans in the previous year to be included in the sample. A total of 261 unique counties are included in the sample. A full set of year fixed effects and county fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * significant at 0.05 level. ** significant at 0.01 level. Note: The dependent variable is the percentage change in reverse mortgage origination during the past year in the county. A county must have had at least 50 reverse mortgage loans in the previous year to be included in the sample. A total of 261 unique counties are included in the sample. A full set of year fixed effects and county fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. * significant at 0.05 level. ** significant at 0.01 level.
